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SEARCHING INSIDE GOOGLE:  CASES, 
CONTROVERSIES AND THE FUTURE OF THE 
WORLD’S MOST PROVOCATIVE COMPANY 
By Professor Jon M. Garon* 
For a company whose motto is “Don’t be evil,” Google certainly has 
its share of detractors. The company is at the center of numerous controver-
sies that will determine how people use the Internet, find information, and 
communicate with each other. The past year has involved both business 
launches and legal decisions that will reshape Google’s future, alter the on-
line environment, and potentially revise copyright and trademark law, in-
cluding: the marketing of trademarks in online search,  the proposed Book 
Search settlement, the Viacom v. YouTube copyright infringement case, and 
looming antitrust investigations. The article explores the future of Google 
as it consolidates its control over online search and advertising and expands 
into telecommunications, mobile devices and cloud computing. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Google has grown to become the largest U.S. advertising company 
and a supplier of a wide array of software products.1  As this corporate be-
hemoth reaches its teen years, the time has come to see how it is growing to 
meet its corporate goals and how the advertising giant affects the world it 
bestrides. 
                                                           
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; J.D. Columbia University School 
of Law 1988.  Prior versions of the article were prepared for the 2009 Midwest IP Institute and 
the 2010 Committee of Cyberspace Law of the ABA Business Law Section, Winter Working 
Meeting.  I would like to thank Susan Stephan for her insights and comments on this project and 
Stacy Blumberg Garon for her help and support. 
1.  Natalie Zmuda, E-tailers Seek Revenue Boost From Ads That May Even Tout Rivals, 
ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 8, 2010, available at http://adage.com/digital/article?article_id=142652 
(“Google is the largest seller of text ads through its AdSense program (that also includes display 
ads), which collectively generated $5.2 billion in revenue for publishers in 2009.”); Mike Swift, 
Google’s Stated List of Competitors Grows From Two to 10, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 13, 2010 
(“Americans use Google for about two-thirds of U.S. searches, and the company has more than 
70 percent of U.S. search advertising revenue, and about 90 percent in Europe⎯say the expanded 
list of competitors is an attempt by Google to paper over its dominance.”). 
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“Don’t be evil.”2  As Google explains to its employees, the phrase is 
“about providing our users unbiased access to information, focusing on 
their needs and giving them the best products . . . [b]ut it’s also about doing 
the right thing more generally—following the law, acting honorably and 
treating each other with respect.”3  The company tells its employees to pay 
attention to these issues.4  At the same time, however, regulators and critics 
around the globe are beginning to question the ability of Google to stay true 
to this mission.5  This review hopes to take the admonition seriously: 
“[D]on’t be evil, and if you see something that you think isn’t right—speak 
up!”6 
II.  THE GOOGLE CORE 
Google is an advertising company that primarily uses its patented 
page ranking technology, named PageRank, to sell advertising.7  The Pag-
eRank technology was created by company founders Larry Page and Ser-
gey Brin while at Stanford University.8  Stanford holds the PageRank pat-
ent, which expires in 2017.9  Google holds an exclusive license for the 
PageRank patent by an agreement which has been extended through 
2011.10  Under the terms of that license, the Google license will become 
non-exclusive after 2011 unless the terms of the agreement are modified.11  
Google has continued to develop its PageRank technology, which may pro-
vide it substantially greater benefits from the patent than competitors will 
have once the patent is available on a non-exclusive basis. 
                                                           
2.  Google.com, Google Investor Relations:  Google Code of Conduct, 
http://investor.google.com/conduct.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2009). 
3.  Id. 
4.  Id. 
5.  See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC FILE NO. 071-0170, IN THE MATTER OF 
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK: DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER PAMELA JONES HARBOUR 
(2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220harbour.pdf [hearinafter 
GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK] (last visited Aug. 12, 2009).  See Pamela Samuelson, The Dead Souls of 
the Google Book Search Settlement, 7 COMM. OF THE ACM, Jul. 1, 2009 
6.  Google Investor Relations, supra note 2, at 3. 
7.  See ZMUDA, supra note 1.  See generally John Gruber, Google Is an Advertising Com-
pany, DARING FIREBALL, Aug. 29, 2005, http://daringfireball.net/2005/08/google_ad_company 
(stating that Google is not a platform based company, but judging from their profits an advertis-
ing company). 
8.  Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 16 (Dec. 31, 2009). 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. 
11.  Id. 
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In addition to its PageRank technology,12 Google uses text-matching 
techniques.13  Like Boolean searching, the text matching software looks to 
the number of times terms are utilized, the proximity of the text on the web 
page and other parameters to determine the rankings of the web search.14  
The current update, codenamed Caffeine, began testing in 2009.15 
Google has expanded its services significantly beyond the mere sale 
of advertising related to its search.16  In 2006 it acquired YouTube, the 
primary free host to user-generated video content.17  In 2007, it acquired 
DoubleClick, a complementary advertising company which placed ads on 
websites based on the content of those sites.18  Google released Orkut in 
2004, a social network site;19 Picasa in 2006, a photo sharing service;20 and 
briefly operated the virtual world Lively in 2008.21 
Google has also become a prime developer of new productivity tools 
for the Internet, 22 often in direct competition with Microsoft, Yahoo!, and 
Apple as well as other Internet innovators such as Second Life, Skype, 
AOL and many smaller competitors.  In 2008, Google launched Chrome as 
a browser designed to compete with Microsoft Internet Explorer, Apple Sa-
                                                           
12.  Google.com, Corporate Information: Technology Overview, 
http://www.google.com/corporate/tech.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
13.  Id. 
14.  See The Spider’s Apprentice, How to Use Web Search Engines, 
http://www.monash.com/spidap4.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
15.  Google Webmaster Central Blog, Help Test Some Next-Generation Infrastructure, 
Aug. 10, 2009, http://googlewebmastercentral.blogspot.com/2009/08/help-test-some-next-
generation.html. 
16.  See generally Andrew Johnson, Game Time, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 9, 2009, at D1.  
See generally Nick Clark, Google vs Apple:  The Gadget Showdown, INDEPENDENT, Jan. 5, 2010, 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/features/google-vs-apple-
the-gadget-showdown-1857964.htm. 
17.  Pete Barlas, Google Says Video Ads on a Roll, INVESTOR’S BUSINESS DAILY, July 20, 
2009, at A6. 
18.  Jim Puzzanghera & Jessica Guynn, Google Gets Grip on Ad Firm, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 
12, 2008, at C1. 
19.  Google.com, Google Milestones, http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html (last 
visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
20.  Id. 
21.  Lively, http://lively.com/goodbye.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2010) (“Lively was a 
network of avatars and virtual rooms created and decorated by its users.  Google launched Lively 
on July 8, 2008. . . .  Lively's users created thousands of cafes, bars, discos, tropical islands, tree-
houses, space stations, galleries, bedrooms and more. . . .  The experiment ended December 31, 
2008.”). 
22.  See Google.com, Google Code: Google Apps, http://code.google.com/googleapps (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2010); see Google Inc., Google Press Center: Product Descriptions, 
http://www.google.com/press/descriptions.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010). 
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fari, Firefox, and others.23  Google is extending the Chrome brand into a 
netbook operating system, which it expects to launch in 2010, directly 
competing with the core products of both Microsoft and Apple.24  
In addition, Google has created Android, a separate operating system 
for smart phones and other Internet enabled devices.25  The Android operat-
ing system is supported by the “Open Handset Alliance,” a Google-
supported manufacturing consortium.26  Android competes directly with 
RIM BlackBerry, Microsoft’s Windows CE/Mobile, Apple’s iPhone, 
Palm’s Pre, and the Symbian Ltd. OS (which is a market leader outside the 
United States).27  Google had further attempted to extend its position in cel-
lular phones with the launch of its own handset named Nexus One,28 which 
was a direct competitor to Apple and Google’s partners in the Open Phone 
Alliance, however Google has since terminated the project.29  Ultimately, 
Google was attempting to uncouple consumers’ purchase of handsets from 
their choice of cellular phone carriers.30  Google’s other web applications 
include Google Docs, Gmail, Blogger, Sites, SketchUp, Talk, Google 
Voice, and Google Book Search.31  Google supports a nonprofit foundation 
and has recently launched a venture capital fund.32 
Despite all Google’s activities, ninety-seven percent of its revenue is 
reported to come from advertising.33  Looking at the wide array of products 
                                                           
23.  Google also had a distribution agreement with Firefox to promote that browser.  See 
Stephen Shankland, Google Chrome: Browser Competition Back in High Gear, CNET NEWS, 
Sept. 2, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/google-chrome-browswer-competition-back-in-high-gear/. 
24.  Johnson, supra note 16, at D1. 
25.  See Michelle Quinn, Helping Digit-ize Google Phones, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at 
C1; see also Clark, supra note 16. 
26.  Id.; Brian Garrity, Google Not Hung Up By Phone Makers, N.Y. POST, Sept. 24, 2008, 
at 40. 
27.  See Quinn, supra note 25; Clark, supra note 16; Mark Long, Android's Rise Crimps 
Palm's Sales and Revenue, NEWSFACTOR NETWORK, Feb. 25, 2010, 
http://www.newsfactor.com/news/Android-s-Rise-Hurts-Palm-s-
Sales/story.xhtml?story_id=0220001UFKRG&full_skip=1. 
28.  Clark, supra note 16. 
29.  Bob Pegoraro, Google Nixes Nexus One, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, available at 
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/fasterforward/2010/07/google_nixes_nexus_one.html. 
30.  Hiawatha Bray, Cellphone Aims to Reinvent Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 2010, 
at B7 (describing the strategy for Google is to ultimately separate the purchase of the cellular 
phone handset from the carrier, a strategy not actually working with the Nexus One thus far).  
31.  Google.com, Google Press Center:  Product Descriptions, 
http://www.google.com/press/descriptions.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010); More Google Prod-
ucts, http://www.google.gom/intl/en/options/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Google 
Product Descriptions] 
32.  Google Milestones, supra note 19. 
33.  Barlas, supra note 17, at A6. 
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and services it provides, one can wonder whether Google still has a focus.  
Perhaps Google is treading the path of IBM, growing too diffuse, risking 
antitrust problems and thrashing in the market without a clear direction.  
IBM reinvented itself as a service company, but only after fighting a 
twenty-year antitrust investigation, the launch of competitors like Micro-
soft, and losing the PC market it had created.34  Or perhaps Google is fol-
lowing in Microsoft’s footsteps, becoming the very company its founders 
most despised; shifting from innovator to aggregator of innovation, acquir-
ing its market share rather than innovating its growth, and struggling to ex-
tend its powerful brand into fields in which it has neither presence nor ex-
pertise.35  Or perhaps the mantra of “don’t be evil” will help it chart a third 
course, which enables it to remain the darling of the public and the stock-
holders alike. 
III.  MIXED MESSAGES AND MERGERS 
Google has grown through both innovation and acquisition.36  The 
most controversial was in April 2007, when it purchased DoubleClick, the 
leading firm in display ad placement.37  
Although Google rules the market for targeted text ads that are 
linked to search results on its own and others' websites, New 
York-based DoubleClick [was] a leading provider of technology 
to deliver elaborate, targeted display ads to websites.  Mountain 
View, [California]-based Google aims to create a one-stop, full-
service shop for companies placing ads online and off.38 
                                                           
34.  Fred Vogelstein, Why Is Obama’s Top Antitrust Cop Gunning for Google?, WIRED 
MAGAZINE, July 20, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-
08/mf_googlopoly?currentPage=all. 
35.  Christine Varney, head of the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, provided her 
prediction of the future.  
 “For me, Microsoft is so last century.  They are not the problem.”  The U.S. economy will 
“continually see a problem—potentially with Google” because it already “has acquired a monop-
oly in Internet online advertising,” she said . . .   “When all our enterprises move to computing in 
the clouds and there is a single firm that is offering a comprehensive solution . . . you are going to 
see the same repeat of Microsoft.” 
Eric Krangel, Obama's Antitrust Pick:  Google is the New Microsoft, BUSINESS INSIDER, 
Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/obamas-antitrust-pick-google-is-the-new-
microsoft-2009-2. 
36.  See, e.g., Louise Story & Miguel Helft, Google Buys an Online Ad Firm for $3.1 Bil-
lion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2007, at B1;  Reuters, Google to Supply Search Ads to EBay, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at C2. 
37.  Story & Helft, supra note 35, at B1. 
38.  Puzzanghera & Guynn, supra note 18, at C1. 
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A Federal Trade Commission antitrust review cleared the merger in 
December 2007.39  Although a four-to-one majority found no horizontal 
monopoly and no lessening of competition, the dissenting Commissioner 
took a more forward-looking view: 
[E]ven more troubling is that the combination of Google and 
DoubleClick likely will affect the evolution of the entire online 
advertising market—especially in light of existing network ef-
fects, and the tremendous additional network effects the transac-
tion will generate. . . .  By purchasing DoubleClick, Google will 
acquire data that will contribute to, and exacerbate, network ef-
fects.  As a result, the Google/DoubleClick combination is likely 
to “tip” both the search and display markets in Google’s favor, 
and make it more difficult for any other company to challenge 
the combined firm.40 
The Google/DoubleClick merger was only one such acquisition that 
raised questions regarding the ability of competitors to overcome the net-
work effects of Google’s omnipresence.  In the fall of 2008, Google and 
Yahoo! were forced to abandon a proposed agreement to have Google ful-
fill some of Yahoo’s ad searches due to Justice Department objections.41   
One year earlier, Google acquired YouTube for $1.65 billion.42  In the 
three years since the acquisition, YouTube continues to lose money and has 
started a transition from user-generated content to content provided by the 
traditional movie and television studios.43  Along the way, of course, it em-
broiled itself in a billion dollar lawsuit with some of those same content 
producers over the unauthorized posting of film and television content by 
YouTube users.44 
                                                           
39.  GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5. 
When a publisher side ad server makes a call to retrieve an advertisement, the advertiser 
side ad server determines the optimal advertisements, pulls that ad from its inventory, and serves 
it into the designated place on the publisher’s web page.  Advertiser side ad servers also provide 
key data that is used to plan, manage, maintain, track, and analyze the results of online campaigns 
across multiple publisher websites.  Like publishers, advertisers pay for the use of ad serving 
services on a cost per thousand ads served. 
40.  GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5. (“A network effect arises when a good or serv-
ice increases in value as more people use it.  Feedback fosters acceptance and enhances popular-
ity, which generates even more feedback, in a continually self-reinforcing loop.”). 
41.  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Yahoo! Inc. and Google Inc. Abandon Their Ad-
vertising Agreement (Nov. 5, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/November/08-at-981.html.  
42.  Daniel Lyons, Watch the Funny Kittens!, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 2009, at 28. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Anne Broache & Greg Sandoval, Viacom Sues Google Over YouTube Clips, 
CNET.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/Viacom-sues-Google-over-YouTube-
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If the DoubleClick merger caused antitrust concerns, the YouTube 
acquisition raised the opposite question:  why acquire a money-losing ag-
gregator of Internet videos?  Never fully explained by the company, the 
elusive answer may also be tied to Google’s long-term media-dominance 
strategy.  Broadcast television and radio are no different in business orga-
nization than the search business—in both cases, the broadcaster displays 
content free to the consumer but surrounded with advertising.  From this 
perspective, YouTube is no different from CBS, Yahoo, or a web search. 
The difference between YouTube and broadcast television remains 
profitability.45  Although Google does not break out YouTube income, ana-
lysts continue to acknowledge the losses at YouTube.46  While traditional 
media is shrinking, it continues to be profitable, and it is further extending 
its reach.47  Founded by Fox and NBC, Hulu.com has already earned 
greater revenue than YouTube on a fraction of its audience base.48  The po-
tential to extend the per-viewer average revenue becomes significant.49  
Google has recognized the shift by entering into distribution agreements 
with traditional media companies.50 
Ironically, Hulu embodies the disruptive technology threatening the 
traditional broadcast television industry.  Hulu is on-demand television 
which directly competes with traditional television.51  YouTube’s user-
generated content reflects a different content segment.52  More accurately, 
however, YouTube still competes for viewership with traditional television, 
and while the tastes and format of YouTube may vary from that of broad-
                                                                                                                                      
clips/2100-1030_3-6166668.html. 
45.  See Daniel Lyons, Old Media Strikes Back, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 2, 2009, at 13. 
46.  Id. (“[Arash Amel, analyst for researcher Screen Digest] estimates that last year Hulu 
took in $65 million in U.S. ad revenue and cleared $12 million in gross profit, while YouTube 
generated $114 million in U.S. revenue but had no gross profit.  This year Amel estimates Hulu's 
revenue will grow to $175 million in the U.S. and that YouTube will take in slightly less.”). 
47.  See, e.g., Hulu.com, Media Info, http://www.Hulu.com/about (last visited Mar. 5, 
2010). 
48.  Lyons, Old Media Strikes Back, supra note 44, at 13; see also Barlas, supra note 17, at 
A6. (“YouTube had 99 million unique U.S. visitors in June, up 38% from 71.7 million in June 
2008, says market tracker Nielsen Online.  Hulu, owned by Walt Disney and other media compa-
nies, ranked No. 2 with just 10.6 million visitors.  Users watched more than 6.1 billion video 
streams on YouTube in June.  Hulu was No. 2 with 348,310 million, says Nielsen.”). 
49.  See Barlas, supra note 17, at A6. 
50.  See, e.g., Press Release, GoDigital Media Group, GoDigital Media Group Adds Pre-
mium Film and Television Content to YouTube (Jan. 21, 2010), available at 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/GoDigital-Media-Group-Adds-iw-1413154268.html?x=0&.v=1. 
51.  See Hulu.com, Media Info, supra note 46. 
52.  See Don Reisinger, Can Hulu be a Bigger Business Than YouTube?, 
TECHCRUNCH.COM, Sept. 1, 2008, http://techcrunch.com/2008/09/01/can-hulu-be-a-bigger-
business-than-youtube/. 
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cast television, such differences will continue eroding as audiences gravi-
tate to YouTube as a source of film and television content.53   
So the question remains whether Google’s acquisition of YouTube 
was a short-sighted folly or a long-term strategy for dominance.54  If the 
broadcasters continue to decline, a central site that delivers content to com-
puters, portable music/video devices, cellular phones and Internet-equipped 
televisions could become the new media hub.  Consumers want conven-
ience and they prefer free.  While iTunes and the iPhone are convenient, 
they are tethered to a proprietary platform with high equipment costs and 
noticeable content costs.55  Hulu is great for traditional television and mov-
ies.56  Google is the quintessential content aggregator—delivered for free in 
exchange for advertising.57  Therefore, YouTube may be a long-play for 
Google.  But with such a dominant audience base, it will pose a formidable 
beachhead against other participants entering the business. 
Google’s history with traditional media may suggest that it has been 
motivated by a strategy to control ad placement across all media.58  Google 
attempted to enter the offline advertising business for newspapers, radio 
and television as an extension of its Internet dominance, but with far less 
success.59  For two years, Google tried to operate a business placing print 
ads60and though the program grew to 800 newspapers, tending to control 
only the supplemental ad space that the papers were unable to sell.61  As a 
result, Google had to close the print ad business, and a month later, Google 
closed its radio ad program as well,62 eventually selling the division with its 
3600 employees.63  Google continues to persevere in advertising sales for 
broadcast television, perhaps because of its long-term synergy with You-
Tube.64 
                                                           
53.  Id. 
54.  Infra Part X (for discussion on YouTube’s copyright litigation). 
55.  Julia Layton & Jonathan Strickland, How iTunes Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, 
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/itunes.htm/printable (last visited Mar. 5, 2010). 
56.  See Greg Sandoval, Hulu’s Backers Bicker as Web Video Soars, CNET.COM, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10398698-261.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). 
57.  See Jack Romanos, The Fine Print in Google’s Plan, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006, at 
M5. 
58.  See Miguel Helft, Google Ends Sale of Ads in Papers After 2 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
21, 2009, at B3 [hereinafter Google Paper Ads]. 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Miguel Helft, Google Ends Its Project for Selling Radio Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2009, at B3 [hereinafter Google Radio Ads]. 
63.  Tribune News Service, Google Cuts Pair of Deals, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 6, 2009, at C26. 
64.  Google Radio Ads, supra note 62. 
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Taken together, the strategy of acquiring companies to expand beyond 
ad placement into the role of ad broker and broadcaster reflects a solid, ver-
tical integration for the advertising giant.65  The FTC analysis of the Dou-
bleClick merger highlights the strategy.66  Google chose to purchase tech-
nology companies that provide toeholds into advertising delivery in each 
media, allowing it to expand both horizontally and vertically.67  Rather than 
become DoubleClick’s competitor, Google chose to pay billions of dollars 
to eliminate a future competitor from the field.68  Implicit in the strategy, 
Google further benefits by eliminating a potential acquisition target for its 
chief competitors—namely, Microsoft, Apple and Yahoo!. 
This approach is not new to Google.  To the contrary, it goes to the 
central business strategy of the company.69  As Mark Cuban recently noted, 
Google “almost joined a long list of companies in the ‘great technology, no 
business model’ archives.”70  In April 2002, Google faced a patent litiga-
tion lawsuit from Overture Services, Inc., “asserting that certain services 
infringed Overture’s U.S. Patent No. 6,269,361” (361 patent).71  Initially, 
Google “denied that it infringed the patent and alleged that the patent was 
invalid and unenforceable.”72  The patent in question covered the heart of 
the AdWords business model.73 
In 2003, Yahoo! acquired control of Overture and in so doing, took 
ownership of the Google core business model.74  As Google prepared to go 
public, it entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement with Yahoo!, 
pricing the “fully-paid, perpetual license to the patent” and mutual release 
                                                           
65.  See Bob Keefe, Critics Decry Expansion of Google, ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONSTITUTION, Aug. 25, 2007, at 4C. 
66.  See generally GOOGLE/DOUBLECLICK, supra note 5. 
67.  See Google Radio Ads, supra note 62 (noting that the entrance into radio ad sales, for 
example, came with the purchase of dMarc Broadcasting). 
68.  See generally Keefe, supra note 65.  One can only surmise that the threat that Google 
would launch  a competitive product may have both brought the owners of DoubleClick to the 
bargaining table and affected the sales price, notwithstanding the $3.1 billion paid for the acquisi-
tion. 
69.  See, e.g., Google Radio Ads, supra note 62. 
70.  Mark Cuban, The Wisest $28.5 Million Ever Spent, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 2009, at 17. 
71.  Google Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q/A), at 13 (June 30, 2004) [hereinafter 
Google Quarterly Report]. 
72.  Id. 
73.  See Usman Latif, Google’s Bid-for-Placement Patent Settlement Cover-up, 
TECHUSER.NET, May 31, 2005, http://www.techuser.net/gcoverup.html (last visited Nov. 29, 
2009). 
74.  See Stefanie Olsen & Margaret Kane, Yahoo to Buy Overture for $1.63 Billion, 
CNET.COM, July 14, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1030_3-1025394.html (last visited Nov. 
29, 2009). 
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of 2.7 million shares of Google Class A common stock.75  The 2.7 million 
shares of Google stock, one percent of its stock at the time, covered the 
Overture 361 patent and other disputes between the parties.76  From a com-
petitive standpoint, the settlement was the flexion point between the two 
search companies.  Google was free to grow its business model and to stop 
denying the patentability of the AdWords methodology.  Yahoo!, which 
had paid $1.63 billion to acquire Overture, received substantially less than 
one-fifth the value of Overture from the Google settlement.77  Yahoo! 
struggled to recapture its investments and began looking back on its strat-
egy while Google cleared itself of potentially game-ending litigation and 
moved forward as the dominant search engine on the Internet. 
IV.  SO WHY THE SOFTWARE?—THE NON-ADVERTISING STRATEGY 
An admittedly cynical interpretation of Google’s “don’t be evil” strat-
egy flows from its own approach to advertising.  Only recently did Google 
begin to advertise.  According to the advertising giant’s behavior, advertis-
ing is evidently for chumps.  Nonetheless, Google has spent some ad 
money on billboards to promote its software suite and its apps, including 
Google Docs.78  A less cynical view of Google recognizes that since Goo-
gle already associates its name with every ad sold on behalf of its various 
advertising businesses, it needs a different strategy to promote its brand. 
By providing free products, Google reinforces its name as an Internet 
                                                           
75.  Google Quarterly Report, supra note 71, at 13 (June 30, 2004). 
76.  See Latif, supra note 73. 
77.  See id. 
At the time of the patent settlement disclosure, 2.7 million shares of Google 
represented roughly 1 percent of the company. Google estimated that the 
shares were worth somewhere between $260 and $290 million. This esti-
mate was based on Google's proposed IPO price range of $108 to $135 a 
share, which was subsequently lowered to $85 a share. Interestingly, even 
the $290 million number does not represent any sort of adequate return on 
Yahoo's $1.63 billion Overture investment. Yahoo was licensing critical pat-
ents to Google at a critical time for less than one fifth of what it paid to ac-
quire them. 
Interestingly, Google never paid anything even remotely close to $290 mil-
lion for the patents. Google quite successfully managed to muddle up the 
math by jumbling together the numbers of the patent licensing settlement 
with the settlement of a separate second dispute with Yahoo. 
Latif, supra note 73.  Mark Cuban’s Newsweek column priced the acquisition at an ex-
tremely low calculation of $28.5 million, but Cuban gives no explanation of how he arrived at 
that calculation.  See Cuban, supra note 70, at 17.  
78.  Tom Krazit, Google Aims at Commuters with Google Apps Ads, CNET.COM, 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10301571-93.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2009). 
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destination and resource.79  Some of these services deliver behavioral ad-
vertising while others do not generate direct revenue.  As a business strat-
egy, these free products are less expensive to develop and deliver than the 
comparable amount of direct advertising.  Moreover, direct advertising is 
generally not friendly, so the Google app strategy makes sense from its 
corporate agenda. 
The bonus for the strategy is the cost aspect of the developed prod-
ucts.  By focusing on the core business of Microsoft (including free com-
petitive products for operating systems, browsers, documents, spreadsheets, 
presentations, e-mail, and calendars), Google highlights Microsoft’s vul-
nerability to alternatives.80  Microsoft’s attempt to retaliate with Bing had 
limited impact since it does not compete with the AdSense advertising 
placement component of Google’s ad network.  
V.  INTERLOCKING DIRECTORSHIPS A MONOPOLY DANGER—WHO KNEW? 
One consequence of the free app marketing strategy for Google has 
been the strategy clash with Google’s former chum, Apple.  Eric Schmidt, 
Google’s CEO, had joined the Apple board of directors in 2006.81  Shortly 
thereafter, Schmidt joined Apple CEO Steve Jobs “to announce Apple's 
first iPhone.”82  At the time, Schmidt “joked about merging the two com-
panies and calling it ‘AppleGoo,’ citing the compatibility in corporate cul-
tures.”83  
The cultures were very compatible, both driven by innovation and a 
deep distrust, if not hatred, of common competitor, Microsoft.  Apple and 
Microsoft were direct competitors in almost every product line, including 
computer operating software, applications, music players and smart phone 
systems.84  Google’s web-based apps reduced Microsoft’s advantage from 
                                                           
79.  See Google Press Center:  Product Descriptions, supra note 31 (showing a list of 
many of the free useful products Google offers).  
80.  See J. Nicholas Hoover, Google, IBM Take Another Run at Microsoft’s Office Suite, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/news/software/linux/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=202100053 
(noting that despite the competitive products, Office retains roughly a ninety-five percent market 
share). 
81.  Alex Pham, Google CEO Schmidt Resigns from Apple Board, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2009, at B4. 
82.  Id. 
83.  Id. 
84.  See David Sarno, Microsoft  Bids for Relevancy in Smart Phones, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 2010, at B3; see also Allan Hoffman, Web-Based Software Gaining on Once-Mighty Micro-
soft, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Jan. 21, 2009, at 21; Ben Parr, Google Is Now Apple's Greatest 
Enemy:  Here's Why, MASHABLE.COM, http://mashable.com/2010/01/20/apple-microsoft-v-
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its installed base, a change which favored Apple.85 
In the years since the iPhone launch, however, the two companies 
have been on a collision course.86  Google’s Android phone software com-
petes as directly with the iPhone as with the Windows Mobile platform; 
Google’s Chrome browser competes directly with Apple’s attempt to move 
its Safari browser onto PCs, and the Chrome operating system announce-
ment could put Apple’s modest market share at far greater risk than Win-
dows.87  Both Apple and Google court the student and individual user, 
while Windows greatest strength remains in the corporate market.88  Even 
worse for Apple, Chrome is designed to support the netbook market seg-
ment, the lowest cost web-focused machines.89  These compete with Ap-
ple’s iPhone as much as low-end computer sales.90  The growth of the net-
book market has put significant price pressure on Apple’s generally more 
expensive hardware.91 
With such substantial overlap between Apple’s and Google’s expan-
sion, it should have been obvious much earlier that the two companies had 
grown to become direct competitors.  By May 2009, the FTC began an in-
vestigation concerning this overlap.92  In August 2009, Schmidt finally 
agreed to step down.93  Surprisingly, his resignation did not come before 
the competition turned uncomfortably anticompetitive:  
On August 3, 2009, Apple announced that Eric E. Schmidt, 
Chief Executive Officer of Google, was stepping down from its 
                                                                                                                                      
google (last visited Mar. 4, 2010). 
85.  See Johnson, supra note 16, at D1 (“Some technology experts say formidable search-
engine operator Google Inc. dropped a bomb on software giant Microsoft Corp. by announcing 
Tuesday night that it is developing its own computer-operating system.”).  See also Mike Swift, 
Google, Microsoft Vie for ‘cloud’ Control, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 24, 2009, at 21. 
86.  See generally Pham, supra note 81. 
87.  See Johnson, supra note 16; see also Pham, supra note 81. 
88.  See generally Arik Hesseldahl, Students Will Help Save Apple, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 
28, 2008, available at 
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/aug2008/tc20080827_522941.htm; Hoover, 
supra note 80.  
89.  See Johnson, supra note 16. 
90.  See M.G. Siegler, Apple:  Want a Netbook?  Try An iPhone or iPod Touch (For Now), 
TECHCRUNCH, Apr. 22, 2009, http://techcrunch.com/2009/04/22/apple-want-a-netbook-try-an-
iphone-or-ipod-touch-for-now/.  
91.  See Pham, supra note 81. 
92.  Miguel Helft & Brad Stone, Board Ties at Apple and Google Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 5, 2009, at B1. 
93.  Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Bureau of Competition Direc-
tor Richard Feinstein Regarding the Announcement that Google CEO Eric Schmidt Has Resigned 
from Apple’s Board (Aug. 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/08/googlestmt.shtm. 
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board. “We have been investigating the Google/Apple interlock-
ing directorates issue for some time and commend them for rec-
ognizing that sharing directors raises competitive issues, as 
Google and Apple increasingly compete with each other,” said 
Bureau of Competition Director Richard Feinstein.  “We will 
continue to investigate remaining interlocking directorates be-
tween the companies.”94 
However, the investigation did not end there because Arthur Levin-
son, former CEO for Genentech Inc., remains on both the Apple and Goo-
gle boards.95  In addition, former Vice President Al Gore serves as an Ap-
ple board member and as a senior advisor to Google,96 as does Bill 
Campbell.97  
Finally, in October 2009, Levinson recognized he had become a li-
ability.98  Without much additional comment, Levinson resigned from the 
board of Google, but remains with Apple.99  The FTC issued a statement 
the day after Levinson resigned, commending the parties for resolving the 
conflict of interest without resorting to litigation: 
“Google, Apple, and Mr. Levinson should be commended for 
recognizing that overlapping board members between competing 
companies raise serious antitrust issues and for their willingness 
to resolve our concerns without the need for litigation,” said 
FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz.  “Beyond this matter, we will 
continue to monitor companies that share board members and 
take enforcement actions where appropriate.”100 
The interest of the FTC and its jurisdiction under Section 8 of the 
Clayton Act evidently did not extend to Gore and Campbell, the two 
prominent Google advisors who remain on Apple’s Board of Directors.101 
Regardless of the actual inside information passed between the com-
panies, the board of directors should have access to key strategies and trade 
                                                           
94.  Id. 
95.  Pham, supra note 81, at B4. 
96.  Id. 
97.  Cecilia Kang, Apple Director Resigns from Google Board, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2009, 
at B6. 
98.  See generally id. 
99.  Id. 
100.  Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Statement of FTC Chairman Jon Leibow-
itz Regarding the Announcement that Arthur D. Levinson Has Resigned from Google’s Board 
(Oct. 12, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/google.shtm. 
101.  Id.  (noting that Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits someone from serving as di-
rector of two competing corporations). 
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secrets of its company.  Mere advisors, of course, do not necessarily have 
the same access to inside information as do board members. 
If the directors are shielded from the strategic inside information to 
avoid potential or actual conflicts of interest, then they may be failing to 
meet their fiduciary duties.  Therefore, at a bare minimum the interlocking 
boards create the appearance of impropriety.  Section 8 of the Clayton Act 
provides direct regulation of interlocking directorates,102 but the applicabil-
ity of Section 8 depends on the level of financial competition.103 
Section 8 prohibits, with certain exceptions, one person from 
serving as a director or officer of two competing corporations if 
two thresholds are met.  Competitor corporations are covered by 
Section 8 if each one has capital, surplus, and undivided profits 
aggregating more than $10,000,000, with the exception that no 
corporation is covered if the competitive sales of either corpora-
tion are less than $1,000,000.  Section 8(a)(5) requires the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to revise those thresholds annually, 
based on the change in gross national product.  The new thresh-
olds, which take effect immediately, are $25,319,000 for Section 
8(a)(1), and $2,531,900 for Section 8(a)(2)(A).104 
The interlock problem is self-evident.  “[W]hen an individual simul-
taneously serves as an officer or director of two competing companies, he 
or she stumbles into a prime opportunity for collusion—for example, coor-
dination of pricing, marketing, or production plans of the two compa-
nies.”105  The self-evident concept may be more difficult for the FTC to en-
force.  Given that Google has no “competitive sales” of its free products, 
the FTC will need to value the competitive products in a different manner if 
it wishes to use Section 8 jurisdiction.  
Nonetheless, the interlocking board problem violates Google’s inter-
nal policies on conflict of interest: 
All of us should avoid circumstances that present even the ap-
                                                           
102.  Clayton Act of 1914 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (2009) (“No person shall, at the same time, 
serve as a director or officer in any two corporations . . . that are . . . by virtue of their business 
and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement be-
tween them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws . . . .”). 
103.  See id. 
104.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BILLING CODE 6750-01P, REVISED JURISDICTIONAL 
THRESHOLDS FOR SECTION 8 OF THE CLAYTON ACT, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/P859910sec8.pdf. 
105.  Gale T. Miller, Interlocking Directorates and the Antitrust Laws, 26 COLO. LAW. 53, 
53 (1997); see also Benjamin M. Gerber, Enabling Interlock Benefits While Preventing Anticom-
petitive Harm: Toward an Optimal Definition of Competitors Under Section 8 of the Clayton Act, 
24 YALE J. ON REG. 107, 112 (2007). 
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pearance of such a conflict.  When faced with a potential con-
flict of interest, ask yourself: 
 
Would this relationship or situation embarrass me or Goo-
gle if it showed up on the front page of a newspaper or the 
top of a blog? 
 
Am I reluctant to disclose the relationship or situation to 
my manager, Legal or Ethics & Compliance? 
 
Could the potential relationship or situation create an in-
centive for me, or be perceived by others to create an in-
centive for me, to benefit myself, my friends or family or 
an associated business, at the expense of Google? 
 
If the answer to any of these questions is ‘yes,’ the relationship 
or situation is likely to create a conflict of interest, and you 
should avoid it.106 
 
Arguably, any conduct sufficient to trigger an FTC investigation 
should be considered “perceived by others to create an incentive . . . to 
benefit . . . an associated business, at the expense of Google.”107  A second 
reason the interlocking directorates violate Google’s internal policy stems 
from its potential to be a violation of the Sherman Act which prohibits 
combinations in restraint of trade.108  
The expansion of Google from a search company to a software devel-
oper and media distributor changed its relationships with other companies 
in the field as well.  From its inception as a search engine, Google predato-
rily faced off against Microsoft, which was slow to embrace the Internet, in 
its attempt to dominate the browsers needed to access the Internet.109 
                                                           
106.  Google Investor Relations, supra, note 2 at § 3. 
107.  Id. 
108.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is declared to be illegal.”); 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”); see also James F. Pon-
soldt & Christopher D. David, A Comparison Between U.S. and E.U. Antitrust Treatment of Tying 
Claims Against Microsoft: When Should the Bundling of Computer Software Be Permitted?, 27 
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 421, 426 (2007). 
109.  Microsoft licensed third party software to launch its MSN search service in 1998, the 
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When Google was a scrappy young company fighting the Microsoft 
colossus, its sniping tactics designed to tweak Microsoft had little market 
effect.  Today, Google dominates the search market.110  Any actual collu-
sion between Apple and Google regarding operating systems or browsers 
would violate the Sherman Act and sitting together in board meetings re-
garding these products cannot help but raise at least the appearance of im-
propriety.111  Schmidt’s resignation is a good step, but all overlapping di-
rectors should be eliminated if the company takes its ethical code seriously. 
VI.  ANTITRUST CONCERNS EXTEND TO CONTENT – THE GOOGLE BOOK 
SEARCH SETTLEMENT 
Stemming from Google’s drive to organize all information,112 it began 
the process of digitizing books at the nation’s great libraries, starting with 
Page’s alma mater, the University of Michigan.113 
“Even before we started Google, we dreamed of making the in-
credible breadth of information that librarians so lovingly orga-
nize searchable online,” said Larry Page, Google co-founder and 
president of Products.  “Today we're pleased to announce this 
program to digitize the collections of these amazing libraries so 
that every Google user can search them instantly.   
 
Our work with libraries further enhances the existing Google 
Print program, which enables users to find matches within the 
full text of books, while publishers and authors monetize that in-
formation,” Page added. . . . 
 
For publishers and authors, this expansion of the Google Print 
program will increase the visibility of in and out of print books, 
                                                                                                                                      
same year that Google was launched and its founders started looking for buyers.  In 2005, Micro-
soft replaced Yahoo! Search technology with its own software, significantly revising the product 
with Microsoft Live Search in 2006 and Bing in 2009.  Reflecting the changing fortunes of these 
companies, Microsoft entered into a revenue agreement shortly after the launch of Bing under 
which Yahoo! has replaced all its search software with the Microsoft product in exchange for a 
revenue sharing agreement.  See History of Search Engines: From 1945 to Google 2007, 
http://www.searchenginehistory.com/ (last visited Aug, 12, 2009).  
110.  See Vogelstein, supra note 33. 
111.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
112.   See Google Milestones, supra note 19 (“Google’s mission [is] to organize the 
world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful.”). 
113.  Tom Tigani, University-Google Digitization Effort Turns Page Toward Future in 
Book Access, THE UNIVERSITY RECORD ONLINE, Dec. 4, 2006, available at 
http://www.ur.umich.edu/0607/Dec04_06/09.shtml. 
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and generate book sales via “Buy this Book” links and advertis-
ing.  For users, Google's library program will make it possible to 
search across library collections including out of print books and 
titles that weren't previously available anywhere but on a library 
shelf.114 
 
The project has developed an unprecedented scale. Professor Pamela 
Samuelson described it as “[o]ne of the most significant developments in 
the history of books, as well perhaps in the history of copyright. . . .”115  
The process resulted in an abortive competitive effort from Microsoft, and 
lawsuits by the Authors Guild and a group of commercial publishers.116  
After three years of negotiations, the litigation resulted in a proposed set-
tlement between the Authors Guild, the Association of American Publish-
ers, and Google.117  The proposed settlement received preliminary approval 
November 14, 2008, but final approval has been delayed by public criti-
cism and the  Justice Department’s interest in the settlement terms.118  After 
the parties made revisions to address these concerns, the District Court 
granted preliminary approval to the Amended Settlement Agreement on 
November 19, 2009.119  
                                                           
114.  Google Checks Out Library Books, 
http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/print_library.html (last visited August 17, 2009). 
115.  Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 
MINN. L.REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 1), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1535067 [hereinafter Samuelson-Manuscript]  
116.  See Class Action Complaint at 2, The Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at 
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlementresources.attachment/authors-guild-v-
google/Authors%20Guild%20v%20Google%2009202005.pdf; see Complaint at 1, McGraw-Hill 
Co., Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8881 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at 
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlementresources.attachment/mcgraw-
hill/McGraw-Hill%20v.%20Google%2010192005.pdf. 
117.  See Amended Settlement Agreement, The Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 
8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 
2010).  See also Google Books Settlement Agreement, 
http://books.google.com/googlebooks/agreement/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); The Authors Guild 
v. Google Settlement Resources Page, http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-
resources.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2010).  
118.   Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement, The Authors Guild v. 
Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), available at 
http://www.authorsguild.org/advocacy/articles/settlement-resources.attachment/111408-signed-
prelim/111408%20Signed%20Prelim%20Approv.pdf; see also Statement of Interest by the U.S. 
Dept. of Justice Regarding the Proposed Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Case 
No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f250100/250180.pdf 
119.  Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Amended Settlement Agreement, The 
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The focus of the public concern has not centered on any copyright 
considerations.  Google’s action of copying materials which are not in the 
public domain violates the exclusive rights of authors and publishers,120 but 
such violations may be permitted under the law if it constitutes fair use.121  
Interestingly, whether the public perceives Google’s actions as copyright 
infringement or as fair use seems to turn on the individual’s more general 
view of Google as a socially desirable public benefactor or as a piratical 
advertising shill.  Even though “motive” is not part of the fair use analysis, 
such characterization often affects the fact finder’s ultimate disposition.122  
Reproduction of a work, unlike performance or display, does not need to be 
conducted publicly to constitute infringement.123  As courts have recog-
nized, copying may still be actionable.124 
[I]ntermediate copying . . . may infringe the exclusive rights 
granted to the copyright owner in section 106 of the Copyright 
Act regardless of whether the end product of the copying also 
infringes those rights.  If intermediate copying is permissible 
under the Act, authority for such copying must be found in one 
of the statutory provisions to which the rights granted in section 
106 are subject.125 
Of course, the copying of public domain materials is of high social 
utility and benefit.  Those materials are not in question.  Google has made 
these public domain works generally available, though it incorporates a 
Google watermark onto the PDF copy.126  Nonetheless, Google has already 
begun to make commercial use of its public domain library by licensing the 
collection to Sony for its e-book reader.127  This may have significant 
commercial utility for both Google and Sony, but because exploitation of 
the public domain for commercial advantage is economically efficient, it 
                                                                                                                                      
Authors Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), supra note 116.  
120.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
121.  Id. at § 107. 
122.  Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) with 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1985); Video Pipeline, 
Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm’t, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198 (3d. Cir. 2003). 
123.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).  Public performance and display are distinguished from the 
other exclusive rights under the statute. 
124.  Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d at 207; Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 
1517–19 (9th Cir. 1992). 
125.  Sega, 977 F.2d at 1519. 
126.  See Samuelson-Manuscript,  supra note 115, at 1, n.7. 
127.  See Brief for Sony Electronics Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Proposed Google 
Book Search Settlement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 CV 8136 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
8, 2009), available at http://thepublicindex.org/docs/letters/sony.pdf. 
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should be lauded.128  Nonetheless, Professor Samuelson raises concerns 
that nothing in the proposed book settlement requires Google to “withdraw 
these books from display . . . or to charge for them in the future.”129  The 
only limit on Google regarding the public domain works is the public do-
main nature of the files.  The mere scanning of the PDF is insufficient to 
make the books copyrightable.130  Moreover, it is unlikely the imposition of 
the watermark will rise to the level of trademark protection for the public 
domain works.131  “The right to copy, and to copy without attribution, once 
a copyright has expired, like ‘the right to make [an article whose patent has 
expired]—including the right to make it in precisely the shape it carried 
when patented—passes to the public.’”132  Were Google to attempt to ex-
tend any ownership on its public domain materials, it would not only vio-
late a long line of established Supreme Court intellectual property prece-
dent, but it would undoubtedly jump from public darling to imperial 
predator in a single step.133  Therefore, the public domain should remain 
safe since the public benefitted from its diligence. 
Unlike the public domain materials, the copying by Google of copy-
righted books, without authorization, constitutes intermediate copying 
without regard to the eventual display of those books.  At first blush, the 
copyright case closest to the Google Book Project is UMG Recordings v. 
MP3.com, Inc., where, MP3.com provided a service similar to the service 
Google provides.134 
[D]efendant MP3.com, on or around January 12, 2000, launched 
its “My.MP3.com” service, which it advertised as permitting 
subscribers to store, customize and listen to the recordings con-
tained on their CDs from any place where they have an internet 
connection.  To make good on this offer, defendant purchased 
tens of thousands of popular CDs in which plaintiffs held the 
copyrights, and, without authorization, copied their recordings 
onto its computer servers so as to be able to replay the record-
ings for its subscribers.135 
                                                           
128.  Id. 
129. See Samuelson-Manuscript,  supra note 115, at 1, n.7. 
130.  Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“originality requires 
independent creation plus a modicum of creativity”); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 
158 F.3d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). 
131.  See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–32 (2003). 
132.  Id. at 33 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964)). 
133.  See generally Sega, 977 F.2d at 1510. 
134.  UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
135.  Id. at 350. 
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So MP3.com acted somewhat better than Google in that it purchased 
the works it copied.  Nonetheless, even though the space-shifting is pre-
sumably fair use, the massive unauthorized intermediate copying is still ac-
tionable.136  The court did not even consider the issue closely.  “The com-
plex marvels of cyberspatial communication may create difficult legal 
issues; but not in this case.  Defendant's infringement of plaintiff's copy-
rights is clear.”137  One feature of the Google Book Project, however, was 
not part of the MP3.com model.  Copyright owners could “opt out” of the 
system.138 
A brief application of the four statutory fair use prongs highlights the 
importance of Google’s opt out policy.139  The benefits of creating an ar-
chive of the world’s published knowledge is self-evident, so the digitizing 
would likely be deemed as an important and productive use of the works 
copied.  Moreover, even though there is no transformation for any particu-
lar work, the archive as a whole could be deemed transformative, thus fa-
voring Google.140  “The more substantial the contribution that the later 
author makes to the expressive domain by his use of copyrighted materials, 
the more likely that use is to be deemed a fair use. Courts call this type of 
use productive (or transformative) as distinct from simply reproductive (or 
                                                           
136.  Id. 
137.  Id. 
138.  See ROBIN JEWELER, THE GOOGLE BOOK SEARCH PROJECT:  IS ONLINE INDEXING A 
FAIR USE UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW?, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. NO. RS22356, at CRS-2 (2005) 
(explaining the fair use question in the Google Book Project is slightly different than that faced 
by MP3.com because the copyright holder could “opt out” from having the work appear on Goo-
gle’s site.  “After some academic and commercial publishers objected to the Library Project, 
Google took a brief hiatus from scanning to allow publishers time to identify works that they, i.e., 
the copyright holders, do not want to be included in the digital database.  This has been referred 
to an ‘opt out’ plan.”). 
139.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted 
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means speci-
fied by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including 
multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to be 
considered shall include—  
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial na-
ture or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as 
a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding 
is made upon consideration of all the above factors. 
140.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 561. 
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superseding).”141  
As for the second prong, the nature of the works will vary.  Poets may 
be concerned that even a small portion of a book could reproduce their en-
tire creative work, while academic works will be more widely available, so 
the second factor is unhelpful.142  As to the third factor, the amount taken is 
the entirety of the work, thus favoring the plaintiffs.143  As often is the case, 
the outcome could turn on the fourth prong—the effect on the potential 
market for the copyrighted work, and the potential is certainly there.144  The 
digitization could have been licensed for a fee.  The online snippets might 
have a discrete market value and Google should admit that access to the da-
tabase has significant economic value to improve its search algorithms, 
speech recognitions software, and other products.145  The potential market 
could be quite large in the aggregate.  For any one author or publisher, the 
benefits may be modest and potentially market speculative, but taken as a 
class, the market becomes quite significant.146 
Publishers were rightly concerned that a fair use court determination 
would turn copyright “on its head,” requiring copyright owner to object as 
a precondition of enjoining infringement.147  But these are topsy-turvy 
times for which Google’s opt out provision could well satisfy the general 
anti-copyright sentiment of the public.  Still, Google’s honeymoon as the 
only beloved corporate behemoth has been fading.148  If the Book Project 
were perceived as a cynical tool to sell advertising, then Google would be 
seen as usurping a market the publishers should have been able to license.  
If Google could actually make a significant profit, then it should license the 
works, which is the essence of the fair use analysis for commercial repro-
duction. The fair use analysis suggests that the Google Book Search data-
base should be licensed. Therefore, the parties attempted settlement, and 
                                                           
141.  William F. Patry & Richard A. Posner, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake 
of Eldred, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1639, 1649 (2004) (emphasis in original). 
142.  Compare Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that “fictional works . . . require more protection”), with Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1405 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that “fac-
tual compilations . . . may be used more freely”). 
143.  See Harper & Row, Publ’rs, Inc., 471 U.S. at 564–65 (discussing the quantitative and 
qualitative importance of fair use).  
144.  Id. at 566 (“This last factor is undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use.”). 
145.  See id. at 564–65. 
146.  See id. 
147.  See Jeweler, supra note 136. 
148.  See generally Sherwin Siy, Google Book Search Lawsuit Settled, Fair Use Questions 
Remain:  Settlement Proposes Book Rights Registry, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, Oct. 28, 2008, 
http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/1828. 
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the antitrust concerns began.149 
Proponents of the Google Book Search settlement point to the societal 
benefits.  Mark Lemley, a highly regarded intellectual property professor at 
Stanford and a lawyer for Google, explains the benefits as follows: 
The settlement will permit Google to digitize most books pub-
lished in the U.S. Members of the public will have access to 
electronic copies of previously unavailable works:  It will be 
possible to search the content of the books for free, and to pre-
view full pages from out-of-print books for free, allowing mem-
bers of the public to find the books and the information they 
need.  People who decide they want a book for themselves will 
be able to buy a digital version that they can read online.  Librar-
ies will be given licenses to provide free, complete access to out-
of-print books at terminals in their buildings.  And institutions 
will be able to buy subscriptions to vast catalogs of works.  The 
public gets access to works that have, as a practical matter, been 
unavailable for years or decades and have never been search-
able; authors and publishers get revenue from works that had 
long since stopped generating any.  The result is clearly benefi-
cial to all concerned.150 
Lemley’s analysis, however, does not address the antitrust issues in-
volved with Google’s position in this system.151  Nor does it address the 
costs associated with these benefits.152 
One cost associated with the benefit is borne by the rights holders to 
so-called orphan works—those copyrighted books for which the rights 
holder cannot be identified.153  In some cases, the orphan works are created 
when publishers go out of business without assigning their copyrights; in 
other cases orphan works arise from poorly managed estates, or in other 
situations where the rights transfers are forgotten, lost or mishandled.154  In 
these cases, the party with the legal right to enforce the copyright is un-
known, thus making it all but impossible for publishers to ask for permis-
sion to use these works.155  Parties who respect copyright law cannot find a 
                                                           
149.  Mark A. Lemley, An Antitrust Assessment of the Google Book Search Settlement, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431555 (click “one click Download”) (last visited Aug. 17, 
2009). 
150.  Id. 
151.  See generally id. 
152.  See generally id. 
153.  See Samuelson, supra note 5. 
154.  See id. 
155.  See id. 
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legitimate copyright holder from whom to license the rights; infringers can 
act with impunity if they dare.156 
Despite suggestions to the contrary,157 the experience of many enter-
tainment attorneys may bear out the proposition that orphan works do not 
actually dominate the out-of-print market.  In many situations, the copy-
right has descended to multiple family members by will or intestate succes-
sion.  These family members have limited incentive to police the copy-
rights of out-of-print works unless the book suddenly becomes the focus of 
a possible film deal or other high-value transaction.  In most cases, the 
rights holders for out-of-print books are known; they just are not inter-
ested.158  
From an antitrust perspective, the settlement provides Google a 
unique market position to be free of the risk of litigation for all orphan 
works.159  Google will be the only company that can lawfully sell the or-
phan works or monetize advertising related to them.160  Every other com-
pany that elects to do so risks the orphan finding a parent.  The Google 
Book Search highlights the orphan works problem and should encourage 
rights owners to seek their rights with the lure of obtaining lost revenue.161  
Part of the settlement requires Google to support a non-profit, collective 
rights organization called the Book Rights Registry (BRR), who would col-
lect and distribute the revenue.162  The BRR is required to provide prove-
nance information about the works claimed, further reducing the scope of 
the orphan works problem.163  If the revenue is significant, the number of 
                                                           
156.  See id. 
157.  Professor Samuelson suggests that orphan works are “most” of the seventy percent of 
the books in the Book Search repository.  But that appears to conflate books for which the trans-
action costs of enforcing the copyright outweighs the value of the copyright with those works 
which have no one able to enforce their rights. Id. 
158.  See id. 
159.  See Samuelson, supra note 5. 
160.  Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 6.3(a)(i)(1) (noting that Goo-
gle will not receive the authors’ proceeds because these funds are segregated into the Books 
Rights Registry). 
161.  See Samuelson, supra note 5. 
162.  See Google.com, Amended Settlement Overview, 
https://sites.google.com/a/pressatgoogle.com/googlebookssettlement/revised-
settlement/SettlementModificationsOverview.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2010). 
The amended settlement agreement requires the Book Rights Registry to search for 
rightsholders who have not yet come forward and to hold revenue on their behalf. 
The settlement now also specifies that a portion of the revenue generated from un-
claimed works may, after five years, be used to locate rightsholders, but will no 
longer be used for the Registry’s general operations or redistributed to other 
rightsholders.   
163.  Id. 
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phantom works will shrink.  If the revenue is not significant, there is no 
market to monopolize. 
A legislative or judicial modification could further improve the situa-
tion.164  A second class action lawsuit or Congressional act should provide 
a safe harbor for any publisher that wishes to publish a work from the BRR, 
which has not had its copyright owners identified following the five years 
that royalties were collected on behalf of the work.  Such a safe harbor 
would protect publishers if the rights holders ever come forward.  Such a 
solution would negate the cultural, rather than legal, monopoly that Goo-
gle’s presence in the Book Search provides.165 
While there is no doubt that Google will receive some network effect 
benefits from the orphan works, the scope of these rights is trivial to the 
overall publishing market.  This should not be the source of antitrust con-
cerns.  The real value in improving the search algorithms and other prod-
ucts flows from the scope of the database, which is largely built by 
publishers that have acceded to the class action settlement, as well as 
physical access to the public domain works in the collection.166 
A different aspect of the case, however, does raise more serious anti-
trust considerations. Pursuant to the proposed settlement, “Google agreed 
to turn over 63 percent of the revenues and data regarding use and sales to a 
‘Registry’ that would distribute the funds to copyright holders.”167  At the 
time of the initial proposed settlement, the U.S. Department of Justice 
raised antitrust and other concerns.168  “First, through collective action, the 
Proposed Settlement appears to give book publishers the power to restrict 
price competition.  Second . . . other digital distributors may be effectively 
precluded from competing with Google in the sale of digital library prod-
                                                           
164.  See id. (“[T]he settlement agreement takes one important step towards opening up 
access to unclaimed books.  In the meantime, we [Google] continue to encourage legislation that 
provides meaningful avenues for any entity to use these [orphan] works.”). 
165.  See Derek Slater, Google Book Search Settlement and Access to Out of Print Books, 
June 2, 2009, http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/06/google-book-search-settlement-
and.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2009) (“Under the settlement Google will be able to open up ac-
cess to truly orphaned books . . . [t]he need for comprehensive orphan works legislation is not 
diminished.”). 
166.  See generally RICHARD THALER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:  IMPROVING DECISIONS 
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (Caravan 2008) (designating the opt out for the class 
has undoubtedly helped Google win over these publishers). 
167.  Timothy J. Brennan, The Proposed Google Book Settlement: Assessing Exclusionary 
Effects, COMPETITION POLICY INT’L:  THE ANTITRUST CHRON., Oct. 2009, rel. 2 at 2. 
168.  See generally Statement of Interest by the U.S. Dept. of Justice Regarding the Pro-
posed Settlement, supra note 118, at 27 (noting also that the DOJ raised concerns related to the 
representation of the class, which are important to the litigation but less relevant here to the char-
acterization of Google and its conduct). 
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ucts and other derivative products to come.”169 
The Justice Department’s characterization is accurate and has re-
mained unaddressed by the amendment to the proposed settlement.170  The 
proposed settlement allows Google, the Authors Guild, and the Association 
of American Publishers to agree on a pricing mechanism for digital 
works.171  For example, the settlement allows Google to set an institutional 
fee for access to the collected database on a full-time-equivalency (FTE) 
basis.172 
The economic terms for Institutional Subscriptions of Books will be 
governed by two objectives:  (1) the realization of revenue at market rates 
for each Book and license on behalf of Rightsholders; and (2) the realiza-
tion of broad access to the Books by the public, including institutions of 
higher education.  Plaintiffs and Google view these two objectives as com-
patible, and agree that these objectives will help assure both long-term 
revenue to the Rightsholders and accessibility of the Books to the public.173 
To the extent that the Authors Guild and the Association of American 
Publishers agrees with Google that broad access and maximizing revenue 
are compatible, they are engaging in behavior that should be questioned 
under the Sherman Act.174  The goal of authors and publishers is to maxi-
mize revenue, which may be achieved by raising prices or by lowering 
prices to encourage greater adoption.  In either case, the activity of combin-
ing the class action of publisher and authors with Google is a massive 
agreement to set prices.  This fits uncomfortably within the competitive 
framework by:  “(1) the creation of an industry-wide revenue-sharing for-
mula at the wholesale level applicable to all works; [and] (2) the setting of 
default prices and the effective prohibition on discounting by Google at the 
retail level . . . .”175  
Similarly, digital copies of books may be sold at a price “to be deter-
mined by an algorithm (the “Pricing Algorithm”) that Google will design to 
find the optimal price for each such Book in order to maximize revenues 
                                                           
169.  Id. at 17. 
170.  See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 4.1(a)(iii). 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. 
173.  Id. at § 4.1 (a)(i). 
174.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2008); see Statement of Interest by the U.S. Dept. of Justice Re-
garding the Proposed Settlement, supra note 118, at 17 (“these features of the Proposed Settle-
ment bear an uncomfortably close resemblance to the kinds of horizontal agreements found to be 
quintessential per se violations of the Sherman Act.”). 
175.  Id. 
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for the Rightsholder for such Book . . . .”176  This optimization and maxi-
mization allows Google to quantify the market for books based on sales 
data and other information that private publishers could never share with 
one another.  Amendments to the provision imply that the pricing will be 
based on comparisons of each book to the market rather than a dynamic da-
tabase (which would create a further pricing advantage for Google) but the 
requirement that price data be “historical” will not have pro-competitive 
effects.177  The optimization is unlikely to be in furtherance of price compe-
tition or the best interests of the consumer public.    
Contrast the proposed Google settlement with the settlements involv-
ing ASCAP and BMI.178  In the case of the consent action involving the 
performing rights societies, the court administrating the consent decree re-
tains jurisdiction over the competitiveness of the licenses.179  Unlike the 
Google settlement, ASCAP and BMI are not left to set the market prices 
without supervision.180  “Although, under the terms of the BMI Consent 
Decree, BMI bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its 
rates, the setting of appropriate rates remains the responsibility of the Dis-
trict Court.”181 
Absent this continuing supervision, the ability of the parties collec-
tively—or Google on the parties’ behalf—to set the prices for digital con-
tent appears to reach the same anticompetitive heights as ASCAP and BMI 
meet with regard to public performances.  The court’s failure to recognize 
this in its preliminary approval is more likely to be the source of the Justice 
Department’s interest than concern for orphan works.  While the consent 
decree involving ASCAP and BMI suffers from excessive judicial entan-
glement, it has created a mechanism for fair licensing and public account-
ability for collectively managed private intellectual property resources.  
This is the accountability missing from the current proposed settlement.  
Worse yet, the internal dispute process is subject to a blanket of confidenti-
ality, further hiding the mechanisms of the content pricing.182  The move 
towards a collective rights arrangement is in the settlement.  The BRR al-
                                                           
176.  Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 4.2 (b)(i)(2). 
177.  Id. 
178.  United States v. Broad. Music, Inc., 426 F.3d 91, 93 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Because of the 
inherently anti-competitive conditions under which BMI and ASCAP operate, they are regulated 
by court-approved consent decrees.”) (citing United States v. ASCAP, 1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
¶ 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941), as amended, United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 
62,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)). 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. at 95. 
182.  See Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 115, at §§ 9.1, 9.8. 
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ready acts as an author’s rights society, which will encourage membership 
through payments.183  This is only an interim step, however, for “the set-
tlement does not directly confer on BRR the right to license any books.”184 
As with other concerns, Google faces scrutiny over the Google Book 
Search in many countries, such as Germany, France and China.185  The out-
comes and solutions are likely to vary considerably from country to coun-
try.  In most countries, the performing rights societies are government 
agencies, so the ASCAP/BMI consent decree is unique in the world.  As 
such, this proposed resolution is unlikely to be adopted by other nations.  
The Internet may be global, but nations remain territorial and apply their 
laws accordingly.  Hopefully, the Justice Department will insist that the 
court exercise far greater control over the pricing and other collusive as-
pects of the proposed settlement, substituting its own authority for that of 
the American Arbitration Association. 
VII.  COPYRIGHT ISSUES STILL AT STAKE 
Even if the orphan book issues are economically overstated by critics, 
the Book Search Project and the massive digitization continues to have sig-
nificant copyright implications.  The first is simply the existence of the pro-
ject itself.  By its very nature, Google’s action of copying first and then ne-
gotiating only once it held a valuable corpus of content simply flies in the 
face of international copyright law and ethical corporate governance.  In 
essence, Google’s approach has been one of “too big to jail”—an approach 
that has thus far succeeded in the U.S. but is less welcome in other coun-
tries.186  David Drummond, Google’s Senior Vice President of Corporate 
Development and Chief Legal Officer, explains that the “settlement will 
create an educational, cultural, and commercial platform to expand access 
to millions of long-forgotten books for anyone in the United States.  It will 
enrich our country’s cultural heritage and intellectual strength [in the global 
economy].”187  Drummond rationalizes that copying books is no different 
                                                           
183.  Id. at §§ 6.6, 6.7. 
184.  Samuelson-Manuscript, supra note 115, at 10, n. 69. 
185.  Andrew Jacobs, Google Apologizes to Chinese Authors, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, 
at B3 (“Google has agreed to hand over a list of books by Chinese authors that it has scanned in 
recent years . . . in an apparent effort to placate writers who say their works were digitized with-
out their permission. . . .  Google also apologized for any misunderstanding that might have an-
gered authors . . . .”). 
186.  See id. 
187.  Competition and Commerce in Digital Books:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (testimony of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Cor-
porate Development and Chief Legal Officer of Google, Inc.). 
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than indexing web content188—a deeply cynical analysis hardly consistent 
with a company that strives to do no evil.  If the company truly believes its 
actions are beyond reproach from a copyright standpoint, then the choice to 
settle does not reflect good corporate stewardship.  If the company is 
choosing to settle a copyright case it knows it can win because of the anti-
trust immunity it affords, then the public is undoubtedly the loser.  Only if 
the fair use argument is indeterminable does Google have an honorable rea-
son to settle the litigation, a position the Chief Legal Officer seems unwill-
ing to concede. 
Getting past the predatory intent, there is a second shadow thrown by 
the decision to settle the litigation.  The settlement creates another topsy-
turvy result to fair use, making the printing of pages from Google public 
access terminals subject to a printing fee even if the same material printed 
elsewhere would be treated as fair use.189  This creates a normative change 
regarding the expectations of publishers to capture the photocopy revenue 
that has traditionally been considered fair use.190  This normative expecta-
tion will undoubtedly delight publishers—the beneficiaries of the price set-
ting—but actually undermine the very fair use values Google aspires to 
protect.  Google will not be the only source for some of these books, but 
the network effect of Google’s growing content empire may threaten mean-
ingful competition.  As a result, Google’s size may rewrite fair use in un-
expected and unintended ways. 
The impact of “too big to jail” creates an additional copyright policy 
concern.  If the settlement approach creates a precedent, it will encourage 
other copyright predators to seek sufficient network effects in order to 
overcome copyright owners’ objections to the use of their content.  In fact, 
this strategy may already be observed in Viacom v. YouTube.191  As dis-
cussed infra, Google’s size and prominence changed YouTube’s future and 
gave the company the resources to avoid the injunctive relief that ended 
Napster, Grokster, and many others.192  The implication that with sufficient 
                                                           
188.  Id. 
189.  Amended Settlement Agreement, supra note 117, at § 4.8(a)(ii);  see Samuelson-
Manuscript,  supra note 115, at 1. 
190.  Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387; Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 
F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that photocopying is not fair use when done on an institu-
tion-wide basis); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1352-53 (Ct. Cl. 
1973), aff’d by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376, 376 (1974); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's 
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. at 1535.  
191.  Complaint at 2, Viacom Int’l. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007) (No. 
1:07 CV02103), 2007 WL 775611.  See infra note 232 and accompanying  text. 
192.  E.g., MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 
F.3d 643, 645–46 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1004 (9th Cir. 
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network effects a party can rewrite copyright may explain the seemingly 
awkward inclusion by Drummond that the settlement will “preserve Con-
gress’s role in setting copyright policy.”193 
How does the settlement reinforce the congressional role in copy-
right?  Drummond’s testimony on behalf of Google does not actually an-
swer this question, but rather states “[t]he settlement does not establish new 
copyright law; it is not even a determination on the merits of copyright law.  
All the settlement represents is the means by which the class of rights hold-
ers decided to resolve the lawsuit.”194  As such, Drummond both attempts 
to placate those at the congressional hearing, and, at the same time, to ac-
knowledge that the center for the copyright balance has moved to Goo-
gle.195 
Copyright policy has always included a balancing of competing pub-
lic and industry interests regarding the copyright industries.196  Nonethe-
less, the balancing has gone on within the halls of Congress rather than the 
campuses of Silicon Valley.197  If copyright policy can be determined by a 
single, successful player, then the other copyright industries, as well as the 
public, may someday be at risk.  
VIII.  TRADEMARK BATTLES AROUND THE GLOBE 
Antitrust and copyright issues are not Google’s only international 
concerns.198  Being the largest Internet advertiser cannot be easy.  Google 
finds itself defending its intellectual property and business practices around 
the globe.199  The practices are not uniform, yet every act of customization 
                                                                                                                                      
2001). 
193.  Competition and Commerce in Digital Books:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital 
Books] (testimony of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and 
Chief Legal Officer of Google, Inc.). 
194.  Id. 
195.  Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books , supra note 193, at 7-9. 
196.  See, e.g., Russell J. Anderson, Jr., Return of the Guilds:  A Reflection on the Domes-
tic and International Implications of Eldred v. Ashcroft, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 49, 49 
(2003); Christopher M. Bruner, Culture, Sovereignty, and Hollywood: UNESCO and the Future 
of Trade in Cultural Products, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 351 (2008); Mark S. Nadel, How 
Current Copyright Law Discourages Creative Output:  The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785 (2004).  
197.  See, e.g., Hearing on Competition and Commerce in Digital Books, supra note 193, 
at 5–6  (providing an example of a Google representative appearing before Congress, the author 
includes testimony of David Drummond, Senior Vice President of Corporate Development and 
Chief Legal Officer of Google, Inc.). 
198.  See Google Annual Report, supra note 8, at 25. 
199.  Id. 
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raises concerns of local censorship.  According to Google’s 2009 10-K: 
Companies have filed trademark infringement and related claims 
against us over the display of ads in response to user queries that 
include trademark terms.  The outcomes of these lawsuits have 
differed from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  We currently have 
three cases pending at the European Court of Justice, which will 
address questions regarding whether advertisers and search en-
gines can be held liable for use of trademarked terms in keyword 
advertising.  We are litigating, or have recently litigated similar 
issues in other cases, in the U.S., Australia, Austria, Brazil, 
Chile, China, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Taiwan, and the 
United Kingdom.200  
 
IX.  ADWORDS, META TAGS, AND HIDDEN TEXT 
Courts in different cases and jurisdictions have struggled to determine 
whether the use of a trademark by an unauthorized party, to drive web traf-
fic to its site, constituted trademark infringement.201  No court, for example, 
has suggested that the use by a consumer of a trademark in the search for 
products would generate trademark infringement by that consumer.  If a 
consumer uses “Kleenex” as a search term, the search engine will return 
hits for Kleenex® products, Kleenex® retailers, news stories where the 
word was used, and less relevant uses.  Under the trademark first sale doc-
trine, product resellers should face no legal limits from the trademark 
owner for merely “displaying” the availability of the brand at its site.202  
Courts have found liability, however, if the trademark is added to the do-
main name.203 
                                                           
200.  Id. 
201.  See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(explaining the disagreement between Ninth and Fifth Circuits). 
202.  Id. at 1076. 
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lates no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act.  When a purchaser 
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there is no actionable misrepresentation under the statute. 
Id. 
203.  E.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123–
24 (2004); PACCAR Inc. v. TeleScan Techs., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding 
that Plaintiff “PACCAR demonstrated a strong likelihood of success . . . of its trademark in-
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Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 362 (4th Cir. 2001); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. 
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A slightly different question arises if a competitor uses a trademark to 
generate ad links without otherwise using the competitor’s trademark on its 
website.  Specifically, one of the key sources of Google’s income flows 
from selling text ads online, which appear in a box either on the right side 
of the search results or above the search results.204  In a series of cases, in-
cluding Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc.,205 two of Google’s services have 
come under increasing judicial scrutiny, regarding the rights of Google to 
sell access to a trademark holder’s mark. 
AdWords is Google's program through which advertisers purchase 
terms (or keywords).  When entered as a search term, the keyword triggers 
the appearance of the advertiser's ad and link.  An advertiser's purchase of a 
particular term causes the advertiser's ad and link to be displayed on the 
user's screen whenever a searcher launches a Google search based on the 
purchased search term.  Advertisers pay Google based on the number of 
times Internet users “click” on the advertisement, so as to link to the adver-
tiser's website. . . .206 
In addition to Adwords, Google also employs Keyword Sugges-
tion Tool, a program that recommends keywords to advertisers 
to be purchased.  The program is designed to improve the effec-
tiveness of advertising by helping advertisers identify keywords 
related to their area of commerce, resulting in the placement of 
their ads before users who are likely to be responsive to it. . . .  
Once an advertiser buys a particular keyword, Google links the 
keyword to that advertiser's advertisement.  The advertisements 
consist of a combination of content and a link to the advertiser’s 
webpage.  Google displays these advertisements on the search 
result page either in the right margin or in a horizontal band im-
mediately above the column of relevance-based search results.  
These advertisements are generally associated with a label, 
which says “sponsored link” . . . 207 
. . . .  
. . . Google’s objective in its AdWords and Keyword Suggestion 
                                                                                                                                      
Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 
1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Cardservice Int’l, Inc. v. McGee, 950 F. Supp. 737, 743 (E.D. Va. 1997); 
Green Prods. Co. v. Independence Corn By-Prods. Co., 992 F. Supp. 1070, 1082 (N.D. Iowa 
1997). 
204.  Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2009). 
205.  Id. at 123. 
206.  Id. at 125. 
207.  Id. at 126. 
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Tool programs is to sell keywords to advertisers.208 
In early jurisprudence on the issue, the threshold analysis focused on 
whether the sale of the keyword was a “use in commerce” of the plaintiff’s 
trademark.209  The “use in commerce” language in the Lanham Act has a 
number of potentially different meanings.210  Until this year, courts in the 
Second Circuit had interpreted the term to require that the trademark appear 
on the potential infringer’s page; merely purchasing the keyword for pro-
motion of a sponsored link was insufficient.211  Other circuits had not fol-
lowed this interpretation and found the sale of the keywords was sufficient 
to be “in commerce.”212  In a dispute between GEICO and Google, for ex-
ample, the Virginia district court found the sale of the keyword sufficient to 
establish the trademark was “in commerce” and “in connection with the 
sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising.”213  
The Gilson trademark treatise agreed with this broader interpreta-
tion.214  “The ‘use in commerce’ requirement means that the mark has trav-
eled in or affected interstate commerce and ‘commercial use’ means that 
the use attempts to influence consumers to purchase goods or services.”215  
In a similar case involving GoTo.com, U.S. district courts in New Jersey 
found that the use of trademarks as suggested keywords constituted a use 
                                                           
208.  Id. 
209.  See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 406 (2d Cir. 2005). 
210.  See Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 131–36. 
211.  Regina Nelson Eng, A Likelihood of Infringement:  The Purchase and Sale of 
Trademarks as Adwords, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 493, 505 (2008). 
The rationale for relying on the definition of “use in commerce” provided in section forty-
five of the Lanham Act is flawed for several reasons.  First, the courts are applying the definition 
of “use in commerce” outside of the context for which it was intended.  Second, infringement 
under the Lanham Act does not require a visual use of the trademark.  Third, trademark keying is 
a use of a trademark in a manner that indicates the source or origin.  Fourth, the Rescuecom v. 
Google court’s analogy to retail store product placement is flawed.  Finally, the courts failed to 
consider that the invisible use of trademarks in metatags has long been considered a trademark 
use. 
Id. 
212.  E.g., J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. LP v. Settlement Funding LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1780, 1785 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 
(N.D. Ill. 2006); Edina Realty Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1042 (D. 
Minn. 2006); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1844 (E.D. Va. 
2005). 
213.  Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 702 (earlier proceeding) (citing People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
214.  2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL., GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 7A.09 (2009) [here-
inafter GILSON]. 
215.  Id. 
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“in commerce.”216  GoTo’s product “solicit[ed] bids from advertisers for 
key words or phrases to be used as search terms, giving priority results on 
searches for those terms to the highest-paying advertiser.”217  This met the 
“use in commerce” test. 
GoTo makes trademark use of the JR marks in three ways.  First, 
by accepting bids from those competitors of JR desiring to pay 
for prominence in search results, GoTo trades on the value of the 
marks.  Second, by ranking its paid advertisers before any ‘natu-
ral’ listings in a search results list, GoTo has injected itself into 
the marketplace, acting as a conduit to steer potential customers 
away from JR to JR’s competitors.  Finally, through the Search 
Term Suggestion Tool, GoTo identifies those of JR’s marks 
which are effective search terms and markets them to JR’s com-
petitors.  Presumably, the more money advertisers bid and the 
more frequently advertisers include JR’s trademarks among their 
selected search terms, the more advertising income GoTo is 
likely to gain.218 
The Northern District of California adopted this reasoning against 
Google, finding that the use of the plaintiff’s trademarks in the AdWords 
advertising program constituted a use in commerce that is likely to cause 
consumer confusion.219  Other courts have likewise found that the “use in 
commerce” exception is no longer a barrier to trademark infringement ac-
tions.  Cases in Minnesota and Virginia, for example, have tended to con-
flate the concepts of “use in commerce” and “commercial use” but in doing 
so focus on the sale of the keyword rather than its absence on the third 
party website.220  As a result, in those cases, the purchase of a trademark 
has been held to infringe the mark.221 
The Second Circuit decision in Rescuecom reinforces the trend to 
treat the sale of keywords as a use in commerce.222  This opinion is note-
worthy because of the thoughtful correction provided by the Court regard-
ing the technical bar that had developed surrounding the term “in com-
                                                           
216.  800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 292 (D. N.J. 2006). 
217.  Id. at 277. 
218.  Id. at 285. 
219.  Google Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32450, 
20 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
220.  GILSON, supra note 214, at § 7A.09 (citing J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. LP v. Settlement 
Funding LLC, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1780 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, 80 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039 (D. Minn. 2006)).  
221.  Id. 
222.  Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 126–27, 131. 
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merce.”223  
Of course, as the decisions against Google in California and Virginia 
point out, the mere use of the keywords does not automatically give rise to 
liability for infringement.  Rescuecom and Google settled their dispute fol-
lowing the Second Circuit decision.224  Nonetheless, the legal issues involv-
ing Google’s use of keyword advertising continue. 
[W]here keyword placement of . . . advertising is being sold, the 
portals and search engines are taking advantage of the drawing 
power and goodwill of these famous marks.  The question is 
whether this activity is fair competition or whether it is a form of 
unfair free riding on the fame of well-known marks.225 
With the barrier of “in commerce” lifted, the courts must still deter-
mine whether the use by a third party constitutes a likelihood of initial in-
terest confusion.226  The focus of this confusion is generally referred to as 
“initial interest confusion” because the consumer undoubtedly realizes that 
he has been directed elsewhere prior to the completion of the transaction.227  
Nevertheless, where the goods or services directly compete and the mark is 
sufficiently strong, the unauthorized trademark user has effectively pur-
chased the plaintiff’s trademark for the purpose of generating customer in-
terest from the competitor’s mark.228 
Initial interest confusion is still applied through the likelihood of con-
fusion test.229  Although described differently in various circuits, the gen-
eral parameters are the same in each.230  In reviewing the question, several 
                                                           
223.  Id. at 131. 
224.  Greg Piper, Early AdWords Infringement Plaintiff Drops Suit, but Concessions Un-
clear, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 9, 2010 (“Rescuecom is ready to declare victory over 
‘Googleiath,’ it said late Friday, because Google banned competitors’ trademarks from appearing 
in ad copy a few years ago, eliminating one of Rescuecom’s main complaints.”). 
225.  Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d at 704 (quoting J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:70.1 (2004)). 
226.  Id. 
227.  Brookfield Commc’ns. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063 (9th Cir. 
1999); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir. 1997); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257–58 (2d Cir. 1987). 
228.  Brookfield Commc’ns, 174 F.3d at 1065–66. 
229.  MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 167–68 (2d ed. 2009). 
230.  Id. at 166.  See, e.g., Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d 
Cir. 1961).   
Where the products are different, the prior owner’s chance of success is a function of 
many variables:  the strength of his mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the 
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confu-
sion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defen-
dant’s product, and the sophistication of the buyers.  Even this extensive catalogue does not ex-
haust the possibilities—the court may have to take still other variables into account. 
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factors are accorded greater significance, including: the strength of the 
mark, the similarity between the two marks, the good faith of the party util-
izing the second mark, and actual confusion.231  
The strength of the mark often dominates the outcome of these dis-
putes.  GEICO is a famous, heavily ad-supported trademark, and Rescue-
com’s website receives 17,000 to 30,000 hits monthly.232  The similarity of 
the two marks will also play an important factor, limiting even owners of 
famous marks from not to reaching too broadly to stop unrelated uses.233  
Owners of trademarks that wish to police keywords will need to improve 
the survey evidence of actual confusion.  The evidence presented thus far 
suggests the Sponsored Links do generate a great deal of confusion.234  
“According to the survey results, 67.6% of test group respondents expected 
that they would reach GEICO’s [w]eb site if they clicked on the Sponsored 
Links, and 69.5% thought that the Sponsored Links were either links to 
GEICO’s site or affiliated with GEICO in some way.”235  Despite the 
GEICO Court’s disdain for the survey, it nonetheless found these numbers 
sufficient to support a finding of likelihood of confusion for the Sponsored 
Links, though the GEICO Court felt the same survey’s flaw compelled a 
different result for the keywords.236  Such evidence will only become more 
sophisticated in future cases. 
The final factor, however, may become the most significant.  Where 
Google sold trademarks to direct competitors of the trademark holder and 
those competitors purchased the trademarks of their direct competition for 
the purpose of promoting Sponsored Links when the public sought infor-
mation about particular trademarks, courts are increasingly likely to find a 
likelihood of confusion.237  The reason is simple: the sale of trademarks for 
that purpose intentionally deceives the public using the search engine.238  
                                                                                                                                      
Id. 
231.  LAFRANCE, supra note 229, at 168; Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 
492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). 
232.  Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125. 
233.  LAFRANCE, supra note 229, at 170. 
234.  Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google Inc., 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1841, 1846 (E.D. Va. 
2005). 
235.  Id. 
236.  Id. at 1847. 
237.  See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp., 562 F.3d at 125; FragranceNet.com, Inc. v. Les Per-
fumes, Inc., 2009 WL 4609268 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
238.  See N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1226 (11th Cir. 
2008) (providing as an example that false statements made by doctors “logically would influence 
a [consumer’s] decision to purchase the [product] over a competing machine without those quali-
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Other commentators have even stronger opinions: 
Nonetheless, courts should broaden the interpretation to encom-
pass the activities of Google in trademark keying in AdWords.  
Google is more directly involved in the infringement than those 
acting as service providers have historically been because Goo-
gle is not merely a passive conduit for the infringing activity, but 
Google actually sells the trademarks to the advertisers.  Google 
also designs the appearance and sets the location of the adver-
tisements in a manner most likely to deceive consumers into be-
lieving they have selected an organic search result.  Google just 
recently changed the background of the “sponsored links” that 
top the search results from a pastel blue to a barely noticeable 
pale yellow.  The pale yellow background is virtually impossible 
to see, so even search engine users who are aware that paid ad-
vertisements appear before the search results will likely be con-
fused.239 
The alternative view is that the public does not recognize or respect 
brand names, such that the use of those brands in keyword searches is 
merely shorthand for the product category.240  But this approach under-
mines the entirety of trademark practice.  A policy designed to encourage 
the public’s disparagement of trademarks will reduce their value.241  A sys-
tem in which searches using trademarks will not automatically convert 
trademarks into product categories will improve the trademark’s function 
as a designation of source or origin for a product.242 
Keywords are not the only way in which trademarks may be improp-
erly used on the Internet.  Google is often discussed in the context of meta 
tags because some search engines rely on matching words and their fre-
quency for search relevancy.243  “[M]eta keywords tag . . . allows the crea-
tor of a web site to provide additional text for some search engines to in-
dex, along with the text of the web page.”244  Increasingly, the use of a third 
                                                           
239.  Eng, supra note 211, at 516–17. 
240.  See generally Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, The Search Engine Advertis-
ing Market: Lucrative Space or Trademark Liability?, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 223 (2009). 
241.  See id. at 235–36. 
242.  See generally Gregory R. Shoemaker, Comment, Don't Blame Google:  Allowing 
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(2009). 
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party’s trademark in one’s meta tags or in hidden text245 can give rise to 
trademark liability.246 
The liability for use of meta tags or hidden text will arise from initial 
interest confusion where the introduction of the plaintiff’s trademark is de-
signed to attract business for the defendant.247  However, if the use of the 
meta tag accurately reflects the information on the site, then no liability 
should arise.248 
Along with hidden text and hidden links, meta tags can be used to 
fool these types of search tools and create better search returns.249   Google 
will remove a site from its listings if it uses misleading meta tags or hidden 
text and links.250  Additionally, Google does not utilize meta tags or hidden 
text in its Page Rank algorithms.251  As a result, it is not directly involved 
in most meta tag lawsuits. 
X.  ANOTHER DUST-UP OVER CONTENT DISTRIBUTION 
YouTube, a social media network for sharing video clips, has been 
one of the more interesting acquisitions made by Google.252  Purchased in 
2006, the site was regarded as a video equivalent of Napster: an innovative 
technology, a cultural phenomenon, and a hotbed of copyright infringe-
ment.253  By March 2007, the film and television conglomerates had had 
                                                           
245.  Google.com, Hidden Text and Links—Webmaster Tools Help, 
http://www.google.com/support/webmasters/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=66353 (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2009). [hereinafter Webmaster Tools] (explaining that text, such as excessive keywords, 
can be hidden in several ways, including: using white text on a white background; including text 
behind an image; using CSS to hide text; and setting the font size to zero). 
246.  See, e.g., N. Am. Med. Corp., 522 F.3d at 1212. 
247.  E.g., id. at 1222, 1224; Horphag Research Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 328 F.3d 1108, 1112 
(9th Cir. 2003); Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812 (7th Cir. 2002). 
248.  Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803–04 (9th Cir. 2002) (meta tags ac-
curately described content of former Playboy Playmate’s website).  See also Faegre & Benson, 
LLP v. Purdy, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1247 (D. Minn. 2005) (fair use for parody site); J.K. Harris 
& Co. v. Kassel, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1127 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (fair use); Trans Union LLC v. 
Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1039–40 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (fair use). 
249.  See Anne Gilson LaLonde, It’s Still Unsafe to Use a Competitor’s Trademarks in 
Your Meta Tags, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 2367 (2008). 
250.  Webmaster Tools, supra note 245. 
251.  See Vitaly Freidman, Google PageRank: What Do We Know About It?, SMASHING 
MAGAZINE, June 5, 2007, http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2007/06/05/google-pagerank-
what-do-we-really-know-about-it/.  
252.  See YouTube.com, YouTube Fact Sheet, http://www.youtube.com/t/fact_sheet (last 
visited Mar 2, 2010). 
253.  See Jon Healey, Napster déjà vu?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2006, at M3; Chris Gaither, 
Scaling the Heights, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at C1. 
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enough.  Viacom International, Paramount Pictures and other plaintiffs 
filed a lawsuit seeking to stop the unauthorized posting of broadcast con-
tent on YouTube.254  
The copyright owners claimed to have “identified more than 150,000 
unauthorized clips of their copyrighted programming on YouTube that had 
been viewed an astounding 1.5 billion times.”255  There has never been any 
factual dispute that at least tens of thousands of files have been uploaded to 
YouTube without the copyright owners’ consent.  The real question is 
whether YouTube’s efforts have been sufficient under the take-down provi-
sions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to provide it safe 
harbor protection from liability.256  But given the increasingly close rela-
tions Google has developed with the broadcast industry and its continuing 
attempt to serve as advertising distributor for television, the decision in the 
dispute will be largely irrelevant to the long term evolution of video media 
distribution.257  
In the months following the initial filing of Viacom v. YouTube, a 
number of agreements have been made involving licensed music videos 
and other content on YouTube, changing the relationship among the liti-
gants to that of business partners.258  For example, a website named 
Vevo.com has been under development through a joint effort of YouTube 
and Universal Music Group.259  Rather than serving to redefine market 
dominance in the entertainment field for upcoming generations, this titanic 
litigation is likely to merely shift money from one company to another, 
based on historic business practices.  The result will alter the influence each 
litigant has at the bargaining table, but it will do little to shift the transition 
in media relations among content producers, distributors, and consumers.  
Nonetheless, the legal interpretation of the DMCA will have a signifi-
cant impact on other intellectual property companies that rely on the safe 
harbor provisions, and their efforts to comply.  Section 512 of the Copy-
right Act creates a safe harbor for an Internet service provider which serves 
to transmit Internet traffic, temporarily cache content on its system, or host 
                                                           
254.  Complaint, supra note 191, at 3, 5. 
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256.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
257.  See Jessica Guynn & Meg James, Google to Sell Ads for NBC, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 
2008, at C1. 
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Create Music Site, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 14, 2009, 
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content at the “direction of users.”260  The term “service provider means, 
[inter alia], a provider of online services or network access. . . .”261  Al-
though this definition is not particularly illuminating, it is likely to include 
YouTube.  YouTube serves as a host to the videos uploaded by the pub-
lic.262  It provides tools to upload but does not edit or select content.263 
As a result of its service provider function, YouTube will likely be 
immune from monetary damages or injunctive relief if it does not have 
knowledge of the infringing material posted by its users, does not gain a 
direct financial benefit from the infringing activity, and takes expeditious 
steps to remove the infringing material once it receives proper notice of the 
infringement.264 
Given the scale of unauthorized traffic on YouTube’s site, it is hard to 
imagine that a jury would believe YouTube had no knowledge of infringing 
activity.  Indeed, like the facts in Napster, it may become clear that the bulk 
of YouTube traffic was focused on copyrighted material, particularly popu-
lar television clips.265  YouTube acknowledges the significant copyright in-
fringement on the site but counters that it has been diligent in responding to 
notices to remove the infringing material, even when those notices did not 
                                                           
260.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
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See also Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007).   
265.  See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1013 (“The record supports the district court's determina-
tion that as much as eighty-seven percent of the files available on Napster may be copyrighted 
and more than seventy percent may be owned or administered by plaintiffs.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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necessarily meet the statutory requirements.266  
YouTube has long said it removes such proprietary clips when 
owners demand it, but [in October 2007] the company took a 
more conciliatory stance.  It announced a program under which 
copyright holders can provide YouTube with advance copies of 
their programming for identification purposes.  Using new soft-
ware, YouTube said, it can then automatically remove clips as 
users post them.267 
The scale of the problem faced by YouTube is enormous.268  Were 
YouTube not in existence, there would be an even larger multitude of 
video-hosting sites, increasing the burden on a copyright holder to police 
the Internet.   
The crux of the litigation will center on the extent to which the con-
tent owners can prove YouTube staff were “aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent.”269  Any quick search on You-
Tube will generate content that the copyright holders did not post.270  Type 
in a song title and many different performances of the song will appear.  In 
such cases, not only does the copyright holder in the video have a copyright 
infringement claim (against the unauthorized uploader, if no one else), but 
in many cases, so do the composer and lyricist of the song.271  
Google and YouTube continue to improve the technology to filter in-
fringing content.272  Among the tens of thousands of files, there have un-
doubtedly been some notices that were misfiled and some removals that 
were not expeditious.  On the other hand, YouTube transformed itself from 
a small viral company, building a business out of commercial copyrights, to 
a dominant Internet Web host that actively polices content.273  YouTube 
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will likely recognize that some of its value stemmed from the infringing ac-
tivities of the company before it began working more closely with televi-
sion and film companies. 
XI.  SITTING WITH COPYRIGHT ON ITS HEAD 
What does the ubiquity of the unauthorized content on YouTube tell 
us about copyright policy?  Comparing the possible results in Viacom v. 
YouTube with the provisions of the Google Book Search leads to an inter-
esting insight about copyright—the rights are not that important.  In a mi-
nority of cases, copyright owners actively police their highly valuable 
rights, and in a few cases, thin-skinned artists may choose to over-police 
those rights.274  In what seems to be the overwhelming majority of cases, 
however, the copyright owners are comfortable allowing the unauthorized 
materials to remain available, even when the only transaction cost is a sim-
ple take-down notice.275 
The implications from the conduct of copyright owners engaged with 
YouTube, the Google Book search, and other fora suggest that there may 
be multiple norms for copyright.  The incentive for the publisher of a 
highly valuable work is to maximize the exploitation of that work.  This 
may be to control the distribution or simply to garner the revenue.  For ex-
ample, clips from “The Colbert Report” were pulled off YouTube, but 
Comedy Central made them all available in an authorized manner on its 
own site.276  For academic authors, out-of-print authors, and many other 
artists, there may be a desire to give less than everything away while still 
choosing not to enforce the legal rights available. 
The end result is a copyright policy upside down from the 1976 Copy-
right Act.277 Copyright owners are expected to take the first step to object 
to a posting on the Internet.  If the objection is ignored, then the copyright 
owner receives the support of the law. But the copyright owner can choose 
not to act.278 
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XII.  SABOTAGE, ESPIONAGE, AND CENSORSHIP.CN 
Perhaps the most salient example of the peculiar times facing Google 
comes from China, which has been involved in controversies surrounding 
the international Book Search Project, claims of computer hacking and es-
pionage, censorship, Google’s refusal to sell into China, and a belated re-
fusal to comply with local censorship laws.279  Google’s China story begins 
with its launch of Google.cn.280  According to Google’s Chief Legal Offi-
cer, David Drummond, Google “launched Google.cn in January 2006 in the 
belief that the benefits of increased access to information for people in 
China and a more open Internet outweighed our discomfort in agreeing to 
censor some results.”281  
The initial decision to provide Internet service to China, while know-
ing of the obligation to be complicit in censorship and surveillance of citi-
zens, raises ethical issues that every company doing business internation-
ally needs to acknowledge.282  This should not suggest that companies are 
unethical for conducting such business.  Google undertook the launch of 
Google.cn mindful of the ethical tensions involved, and should be recog-
nized for its open discourse regarding the challenging ethical dilemma.283  
At the time, Google co-founder Sergey Brin noted the decision “compro-
mised our principles.”284  So the decision to enter China, while not neces-
sarily evil, was certainly an uncomfortable one. 
                                                                                                                                      
http://creativecommons.org/about/what-is-cc (last visited Apr. 18, 2010) (binding the copyright 
owner to allow all third party uses in the manner specified by the license.  The choice not to en-
force the copyright has far less precedential value on the owner’s property interests than the 
choice to adopt a particular Creative Commons license). 
279.  See generally Posting of David Drummond to the Official Google Blog, A New Ap-
proach to China, http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html (Jan. 12, 
2010, 15:00 EST). 
280.  See generally id. 
281.  Id. (“At the time we made clear that ‘we will carefully monitor conditions in China, 
including new laws and other restrictions on our services.  If we determine that we are unable to 
achieve the objectives outlined we will not hesitate to reconsider our approach to China.’”) (em-
phasis in original). 
282.  James Heffernan, An American in Beijing:  An Attorney's Ethical Considerations 
Abroad with a Client Doing Business with a Repressive Government, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
721, 723 (2006) (stating that a lawyer has a duty “not to advise the client to violate the law under 
Model Rule 1.2(d) . . . [but] . . . under Model Rule 2.1 . . . could permit the attorney to compel the 
client to follow human rights law by bringing other considerations to the client's attention”). 
283.  See KIRSTEN E. MARTIN, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE 
ETHICS, CASE BRI-1004:  GOOGLE, INC., IN CHINA 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.darden.virginia.edu/corporate-ethics/pdf/BRI-1004.pdf. 
284.  Michael Sheridan, China's Great Internet Stand-Off, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 
17, 2010, at 8.  
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Since then the situation has worsened.  In December 2009, Google 
and twenty or more U.S. companies were targeted with sophisticated cyber 
attacks.285  Google and the U.S. State Department publicly suggested that 
the Chinese government is to blame for the attacks, either directly or 
through its tacit approval,286 noting that “a primary goal of the attackers 
was accessing the Gmail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.”287 
Other reports suggest a broader array of targets including, “Northrop 
Grumman, the US [defense] contractor; Dow, the chemicals giant; Adobe 
Systems, the software firm; and an American law firm acting for Cybersit-
ter, a firm pursuing a $2.2 billion lawsuit against China.”288  While these 
targets may include dissidents, it is undoubtedly not the only goal of 
China’s cyber attack policy.  In fact, “Joel Brenner, former director of the 
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, has identified China 
as the origin point of extensive malicious cyber activities that target the 
United States.”289  Comparing the attacks suffered in December with the 
ongoing reports of China’s cyber-intrusions, it is unlikely that the goal was 
merely to harass Chinese dissidents (though the likelihood that this was 
part of the activity is certainly true enough).  
The characterization of the motive for the attacks does not lessen the 
precarious relationship between Beijing and Google—or Beijing and 
Washington—nor does it take away the evidence of the very real threat 
posed by the totalitarian regime.  It does, however, suggest that Google 
may want to depict its response as moral outrage rather than calculated 
economics. Google’s economic exposure to China is presently calculated at 
roughly five percent of its income, with revenues ranging from $300 to 
$600 million.290  Google runs a distant second in the online search business 
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to Baidu, which has seventy-five percent of the market compared to Goo-
gle’s twenty percent.291   
Once it adds the sales of its Android cellular phones, its potential 
revenue and its potential exposure increase dramatically.292  As a result, one 
of Google’s initial responses has been to delay the introduction of the An-
droid phone operating system in China.293  Another of its responses has 
been to eliminate censorship of Google.cn, which is a condition of its op-
erations in China.294  
Do these responses stem from Google’s moral outrage at the blatant 
attacks on Chinese dissidents, or are they the business calculations of a 
company threatened by trade secret theft and the potential risk of outright 
sabotage?295  Increasingly, the analysis of the attack is focusing less on the 
dissidents and more on the damage that may have been caused by the at-
tacks and the potential for the attackers to have inserted their software code 
into the operating software of the targets.296  Such code could create long-
term security breaches or be used for later sabotage;297accordingly the 
situation has worsened for Google and all U.S. content companies.298 
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298.  Esther Dyson, chairperson for EDventure Holdings has written a fascinating analy-
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 Of course, censorship is not a big secret in China. China employs approximately 
30,000 people as censors.  They have names and faces, and they may negotiate with 
a publisher about a particularly sensitive topic.  They are less likely to negotiate 
with bloggers, because there are so many bloggers, but the government reportedly 
does train bloggers in how to post in support of government policy, and if you are 
lucky you can get a job (reportedly at $0.50 per post) doing the government's bid-
ding. 
 So why has Google made a fuss and threatened to walk out of China?  The answer 
probably stems from a combination of—or rather, a changing calculus around—
business interests and values.  The censorship issue has long grated at Google 
(Brin, with his Russian background, is reported to be especially hostile to censor-
ship), but the company could argue that transparency about censorship was better 
than not serving China at all. 
 The censorship, however, has been getting worse.  Perhaps the initial argument 
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Google is engaged in a highly visible negotiation with the Chinese 
government.299  If it shuts down its search engine, Google will claim an ex-
pensive but moral victory, while China will in fact achieve greater content 
control over the Internet and greater market share for its national service.300  
Ironically, shutting the Google search site then becomes a win-win solution 
that may allow Google to continue some other operations in China free 
from the moral dilemmas it now faces and confrontational position it now 
holds.301  It may also be a strategic retreat given the challenges Google has 
faced with Baidu over music search, cyber cafes, and staffing issues as well 
as ongoing government interference.302 
The strategy followed by Google is one previously adopted by Ya-
hoo!303 but not a viable one for Microsoft or Apple to follow.  Yahoo! left 
China, selling back its majority stake in Alibaba (though it retains a thirty-
nine percent ownership interest).304  Microsoft and Apple, Google’s real 
competitors, both have significant software and hardware sales that make 
their entanglement with China impossible to unwind.305  They face many of 
the same hurdles as Google but stand to lose a much greater investment 
were they to follow the moral high road being forged by Google.306  A 
temporary retreat on search services may open the door to renew cellular 
phone competition. 
                                                                                                                                      
was wrong:  Exposing Chinese censorship has done little to reduce it.  Many Chi-
nese support government censorship:  They see it as a way to maintain civility and 
order.  They know that their government is fragile, and they consider criticism 
harmful rather than cleansing.  They trust their government to deal with problems 
over time. . . . 
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Finally, the market may not be as clear cut as these assumptions sug-
gest.  Significant Chinese advertising funds are spent on the U.S. Google 
site, revenue which is unlikely to be lost as a result of the change.307  
Moreover, an increasingly large number of people living in countries with 
Internet filtering are migrating to sophisticated software, virtual private 
networks, proxy servers or similar tools that connect through other coun-
tries’ servers and thereby avoid the territorial limitations and the resulting 
censorship.308  For those users, Google will likely continue to be a preferred 
destination.  Therefore, Google may risk less and have less to lose than its 
blog suggests.309  In contrast, Microsoft and Apple have fewer such silver 
linings to rationalize the coming thunder storm.  If business is a race, then 
slowing one’s opponent is almost as good as moving faster.  Google re-
mains the most nimble giant bestriding the Internet. 
XIII.  PREDICTIONS & CONCLUSION 
Beyond the legal challenges, Google remains in a very competitive 
fight with Microsoft for its ad revenue.310  The introduction of Bing may do 
more to impact the Internet giants than any of the pending litigation.  But 
Google will not stand still.  By next year, its search algorithm will have 
been updated, and its new operating system launched.311  In the upcoming 
environment, it is likely the corporate boards will be unlocked as the grap-
pling intensifies.  Google deserves to face antitrust scrutiny for its inter-
locking board memberships and the horizontal price fixing inherent in the 
Google Book Search.  The discussions over orphan works will continue, 
hopefully with a more robust legislative solution, but orphan works will not 
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derail the settlement.312  The benefits to Google of having immunity from 
suit by a group of parties that cannot be identified will not be the antitrust 
barrier to the Google Book Search.  Despite legitimate antitrust concerns, 
the trajectory of the company remains that of a fierce competitor in a chal-
lenging market.  Google’s copyright liability for YouTube and the Google 
Book Search will continue to be matters of great speculation, but neither 
will have significant impacts on the company or copyright law.  Interna-
tional issues will trouble Google, but these concerns are endemic to all U.S. 
software companies.313  They may preclude success in particular territories, 
but they will not threaten to undermine the company more broadly. 
Only in the area of trademark law is Google vulnerable.  The sale of 
advertising and promotion of keywords lies at the heart of Google’s reve-
nue stream. The sale of trademarks in its AdWords program will continu-
ally grow as a source of liability for the company in the U.S. and around 
the world.  Google and other search companies will be compelled to stop 
trading in the trademarks of others.  To the extent that the use of trade-
marks improve advertising sales rather than merely change where the ad-
vertising dollars are spent, the change could cost Google significant reve-
nue. 
Google has charted its course as an advertising company and it re-
mains one.  It will continue to explore new ways to deliver content that it 
can use to market its advertising, but it will not transform itself into a soft-
ware company.  The real question is whether, in an age of “free,” more and 
more competitors are becoming advertising companies as well.  Does Goo-
gle deserve special treatment for its commitment not to be evil?  If the 
standard is a comparison to its direct competitors, then it has failed.  Goo-
gle, along with Apple and Microsoft, provides valuable products and serv-
ices, but in a tenacious, competitive manner.  Google is no more—and no 
less—evil than the others. 
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